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Abstract
We present a computable model that encompasses several proposals
of the “Florence Regulatory Forum”, initiated by the European Commis-
sion to deal with cross-border trade. Specifically, the model imbeds both
the access to the network and congestion issues analysed by the Forum.
Access charges reflect the mechanism devised by the Forum, and conges-
tion at the interconnection is managed through the coordinated auction
mechanism recently suggested by the European association of Transmis-
sion System Operators. The model allows for various domestic regulation
of the national non-eligible market, and different forms of competition in
the eligible market. We illustrate this flexibility on a stylised but exten-
sive numerical example with the view of showing that the model behaves
properly, and identifying policy issues to be studied in a more realistic
case study.
1 Introduction
The restructuring of the electricity sector has now been going on for more than a
decade in various regions of the world. The various market designs that emerged
from the process testify that the task is not easy. An interesting and relevant
question is whether it is possible to integrate power systems organised accord-
ing to different paradigms into a single electricity market. Integration was the
∗Chief Analyst, Electrabel Quantitative Analysis, Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium.
†Tractebel Professor of Energy Economics, Department of Mathematical Engineering and
Center for Operations Research and Econometrics, Universite´ Catholique de Louvain, Louvain-
la-Neuve, Belgium.
1
1 INTRODUCTION 2
initial goal of the Council [7] when it set “greater integration, free from barri-
ers to trade” as an objective of the European Community in September 1986.
This objective has since been recalled and emphasised in various documents of
the European Commission, e.g. [9, 11]. More than a decade of restructuring
has certainly changed the European power system, but it is not clear that it
has made it any closer to the “real single integrated market” [14] claimed by
the European Commission. Similar problems arise on the other side of the At-
lantic where integration of different zones into a single market has also been a
major objective of FERC’s activity in the year 2001 [29] and in the beginning
of 2002 [30]. An intriguing question is whether this integration requires some
initial harmonisation or not. FERC seems to have concluded that this is in-
deed a prerequisite [30]. Europeans maintain that it is not [25] and propose
mechanisms whereby the integration of systems organised according to different
market paradigms are claimed to be achievable. It is the modelling of these
mechanisms of regional power systems organised according to different designs
into a single market, that we take up in this paper. Our emphasis is on the
European Union and its Internal Electricity Market (IEM).
This work originates in the activities of the so-called “Florence Regulatory
Forum”. Initiated by the European Commission in 1998, “The Forum convenes
twice a year at the European University Institute near Florence and consists of
national regulatory authorities, Member States, European Commission, Trans-
mission System Operators, electricity traders, consumers, network users, and
power exchanges. The Forum was set up to discuss issues regarding the cre-
ation of a true internal electricity market that are not addressed in the Elec-
tricity Directive. The most important issues addressed currently at the Fo-
rum concern cross border trade of electricity, in particular the tarification of
cross border electricity exchanges and the allocation and management of scarce
interconnection capacity” [10]. The results achieved by the Forum on these
two issues are summarised in short minutes available on http://europa.eu.
int/comm/energy/en/elec_single_market/florence/index_en.html. More
technical discussion of this activity can also be found in various reports pub-
lished by the association of European Transmission System Operators (ETSO,
http://www.etso-net.org). The work of the Forum also led to new EU leg-
islative proposals [12, 13]. One of these proposals, namely the draft regulation
on cross border trade is analysed in Boucher and Smeers [1]. An overview of the
lengthy process towards the internal electricity market is given in Smeers [40].
This paper concentrates on the two problems addressed by the Forum,
namely access to the network and allocation of interconnection capacities. Like
any other question in EU, the treatment of these issues is driven by subsidiarity.
The principle of subsidiarity, which appears in the Maastricht Treaty, “articu-
lates a presumption that the power of EC institutions should be limited to those
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functions that cannot be adequately performed by the Member States” [4]. This
principle is certainly fully justified if applied in a strict sense. The practice is
that it appears to be often biased by political contingencies. Technically or po-
litically difficult questions, for which a solution at the EU level is warranted, are
sometimes left to subsidiarity because of the difficulty of finding an agreement
among Member States. The main IEM legislation of the EU, namely Directive
96/92/EC [8] is a masterpiece in this respect. Hancher [33] calls it “a framework
in the loosest sense of the word: its objectives are laid down in very general ter-
minology and moreover, Member States are given a substantial degree of choice
in how they are about introducing more competition into their electricity mar-
kets. Indeed the margin is so substantial that it would seem possible for the
determined anti-market countries to avoid introducing any meaningful degree of
competition at all” (see also [32]). The Florence Forum was to overcome some
of these deficiencies, particularly those related to cross border trade.
The work of the Forum is also subject to subsidiarity. This implies that a bal-
ance should be found between EU-wide and Member States specific solutions in
both access to the network and allocation of the interconnection capacities. One
could argue that economic analysis provides a relatively clear-cut case in favour
of a common EU congestion management system. The absence of a standard
market design indeed introduces various market incompleteness that eventually
jam the physical market and hence the derived financial market (see Smeers [39]
and Boucher and Smeers [1]). The result is that a real single integrated market
composed of different market designs will only be a fraction of what it could
be in a more harmonised structure. This is the reasoning that seems to have
recently been adopted in the US [30] where a common market design is now
clearly advocated. A strong argument can thus be made that subsidiarity man-
dates a common congestion management system. Interestingly enough, ETSO
concludes differently. In [25] it indeed asserts, but does not justify, that “This
goal will be achieved by providing practical market-based mechanisms to man-
age congestion between regions, while allowing the co-existence and evolution
of different market structures within regions”. Coordinated auction [20] is the
mechanism proposed for achieving this goal. It is this mechanism that we sup-
pose in this paper.
The need for harmonisation is less compelling for the other problem discussed
by the Forum, namely access to the network. First, unlike congestion, this
problem is not a matter of market design in the sense that one is not trying
to find prices to allocate some restricted capacities. One can indeed conceive a
seamless access to the network that is based on sufficiently harmonised but not
identical rules among Member States. Subsidiarity therefore suggests but does
not mandate that the problem be handled at EU level. This is what the Forum
proposed: Member States will adopt common rules but some leeway is allowed
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on how they set some parameters appearing in these rules. Needless to say, some
distortion of competition will result from the arrangement. But distortions seem
unavoidable, whatever the economic sectors, whether among EU Member States
or in more federal systems like the US. The relevant question is whether this
distortion of competition is significant enough to seriously endanger the goal of
the single integrated market. This is the problem that we try to explore in this
paper though a computable model.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 briefly introduces the outcomes
of the Florence Regulatory Forum, which are then elaborated on in more detail
in sections 3 and 4. Section 5 provides a modelling framework that tries to
capture the essential features of the Forum proposals. This model is a very
schematic but it contains many ingredients that allow it to be developed into a
more realistic description of the EU power system. In short, the EU is modelled
as a set of control areas separated by interconnection capacities. In compliance
with the Directive 96/92/EC, and in view of the inconclusive outcome of the
Barcelona Council of March 2002, we retain both an eligible and non-eligible
(whether legal or de facto) market in each control area. Divestiture of capacities
by domestic companies took place in the EU, with the result that there are
now several generation companies in each Member State. This is modelled too.
These producers serve the domestic market and engage in cross border activities.
This results in several payments due to the use of the domestic and international
networks. Specifically international transactions give rise to two charges. One
is a contribution to the fixed charges of foreign networks, and the other is a
congestion charge on the interconnection.
Directive 96/92/EC left quite a lot of flexibility to Member States to organise
their domestic power systems. This applies to both network cost allocation and
congestion management. For the sake of simplicity, this stylised model follows
the common wisdom and assumes away congestion in the domestic grid. This
simplification allows one to focus attention on the allocation of network costs
and congestion at the interconnection. We consider several commonly discussed
fixed cost allocation procedures and suppose, because of subsidiarity, that dif-
ferent methods can be implemented in different Member States. Following both
ETSO’s recommendations and the developments observed on the market, we
suppose that access to the interconnection is ruled by an auction that allocates
the transfer capacities (see section 3 for definition and discussion of transfer
capacities) to those that attribute the highest value to it. Auctioning transmis-
sion capacities is one of the proposals of the Florence Forum that is currently
(and sometimes naively) implemented on interfaces in continental Europe. Co-
ordinated auction [20, 26] is the mechanism proposed by the ETSO to allocate
transmission capacities while allowing to retain the diversity of organisation of
national markets. We therefore model the allocation of transmission capacities
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according to this principle. This discussion completes the institutional descrip-
tion of the EU restructured electricity system. Section 6 cast these different
elements into a computable model. In this model, and in compliance with the
outcome of the Florence Regulatory Forum, the determination of some parame-
ters of the allocation rules is left to Member States. Assuming the network cost
allocation parameters, the end result is an equilibrium model that imbeds both
cost allocations procedures and the concurrent auction process of transmission
capacities. Because market power seems unavoidable in electricity, the model
also encompasses different assumptions in this respect, as well as a different
form of regulation of the non-eligible market.
Section 7 moves one step further and considers the problem of choosing the
cost allocation parameters at Member State level, as a game between national
regulators. There is indeed no EU regulator in electricity, and it is unlikely that
there will be one, as this would be (opportunistically) argued as an unaccept-
able violation of subsidiarity. But there is a Committee of European Electricity
Regulators, namely the CEER (note that there is no German Regulator and
hence the German participation to CEER is through a Member of the adminis-
tration). One can ideally assume that the members of that Committee behave
cooperatively seeking to achieve the common good. Alternatively, the natu-
ral interpretation of the absence of a EU regulator is that national regulators
behave non cooperatively. We therefore model the actions of the members of
CEER as a Nash equilibrium where each regulator selects the fixed cost alloca-
tions parameters in a way that maximises the welfare of its own constituency
taking the actions of the other regulators as given. We compare this solution to
the one where there would be a single EU regulator that maximises the overall
welfare of the EU. Because these regulatory actions determine a market between
producers and consumers, the overall problem is a two-stage game: regulators
decide on the network cost allocation parameters in a first stage taking into
account the reaction of the market in the second stage of the game. Section 8
gives numerical results for a stylised example.
The various tests conducted indicate that the model performs as expected
on those phenomena that we know well from economic theory. The possible
distortion of competition that results from the allocation of the fixed costs of the
network shows up as expected and welfare increases when one moves from a non-
cooperative to a cooperative equilibrium. But the model also reveals that some
allocation methods foreseen by the compensation mechanism do not necessarily
perform as expected: they may induce undesired effects. Even though both the
compensation methods and allocations of network costs may not influence total
welfare much, they drastically influence the allocation of that welfare. Last but
not least, the model reveals a close interaction between the access charge and the
value of the interconnection. This indicates that these two problems which have
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been considered separately by the Florence Forum may be more interdependent
than expected.
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2 The Outcome of the Florence Regulatory Fo-
rum
As indicated above the mandate of the Florence Regulatory Forum is to ex-
plore the questions of access to the network and congestion management of the
interconnection. We summarise the outcome of this work on the basis of pa-
pers published by the organisation of European Transmission System operators
(http://www.etso-net.org). Briefly speaking, these documents deal with :
a. The elimination of pancaking in access to the network, through
a new system of access rules. These are briefly presented in section 3 of
this paper on the basis of [17, 23, 31]. In short, the objective is to arrive at a
license plate system, such as found in the USA and NordPool. In such a system,
each agent pays a given fee for connecting to the network. This fee allows this
agent to trade with any counter-party connected to the grid. The question
faced by ETSO was to find a method for computing this fee in such a way that
it recovers the embedded cost of the local network and the cost imposed by
some transactions in different parts of the grid. While the rules elaborated by
ETSO apply to the whole of the EU, they contain some parameters that are
left to subsidiarity. Needless to say the choice of these parameters will have
an impact on the cost charged to the different agents and hence on the relative
competitiveness of generators located in different zones of the integrated market.
The assessment of this effect is one of the objectives of our computable model.
b. A system of congestion management for allocating interconnection
capacities. Many ETSO documents [15, 16, 18, 19, 20, 21, 25, 26, 27, 28] deal
with the allocation of interconnection capacities. The notion of transfer capacity
and various congestion management methods are discussed in these papers. We
rely on the idea of coordinated auction introduced by ETSO in April 2001 [20]
and since advocated as the principle that will allow one to retain the current
diversity of institutions in the electricity market. A discussion of this claim can
be found in Boucher and Smeers [2].
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3 Network Costs and Access Charges
The elaboration of conditions for accessing the network constitutes the first sub-
ject addressed by the Forum. The principles supposed to rule these conditions
are stated in Articles 3 and 4 of the draft regulation [12]. We here discuss their
implementation as it results from ETSO’s work. The following principles taken
from [24] summarise the situation :
1. “TSOs hosting transits should be compensated for costs associated with the
use of new and existing infrastructure”
2. “Cost calculations should be standardised, transparent and based on real
flows”
3. “Exporting and importing TSOs should compensate TSOs hosting transits
in proportion to the energy exported and/or imported and based on physical
flows”
4. “Full infrastructure costs will be considered for inter TSO compensation”
5. “The new costs or incomes for TSOs from the compensation mechanisms
should be transferred to the domestic transmission tariffs”
6. “It is not the role of the compensation mechanisms to provide short or
long-term economic signals”
7. “Cost for losses should be considered for the inter TSO compensation”
Principle 1 states that some TSOs incurs costs because of transit. They
should be compensated for these costs. This cannot be disputed. Principle
2 is also fully justified. Its second sentence that states that cost should be
measured with respect to real flows has a flavour of cost allocation. All ETSO’s
documents confirm that the whole reasoning of the organisation is in terms
of cost allocation. Even though this is probably the only possible operational
approach to the problem, one can remark that cost allocation does not comply
with the principle of average long run incremental cost stated in article 3.6. of
the draft regulation. We do not elaborate any further here on this issue and take
it for granted that ETSO’s aim is to develop a cost allocation scheme that tries
to reflects cost causality. Principle 3 is a simplification (possibly quite justified)
with respect to physical realities. It states that the cost due to transit originates
in import and/or export. Strictly speaking this is not true as loop flows make it
possible for domestic transaction to have an impact on transit costs as defined
in article 2 of the draft regulation. This effect is neglected here, which simplifies
the problem.
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Principle 4 is puzzling. ETSO had in the past [17] developed the concept of
horizontal network with the view of identifying this part of the network those
cost would capture the costs of transit. The Horizontal Network is the “part
of the transmission system, which is used to transmit electricity between coun-
tries and within the country: it contains the transmission system elements that
are influenced significantly by cross-border exchanges”. The Vertical Network
consists of the local transmission and/or distribution, allowing the access of
both the load and the generation to this Horizontal Network. The notion of
an horizontal network is somewhat arbitrary from a physical or economic point
of view. But it is fully compatible with a cost allocation perspective. ETSO
endeavoured to assess the costs of these two parts of the network by conducting
systematic load flow computations and measuring the use of the infrastructure
due to international flow. The Belgian regulator objected to only relying on the
cost of the horizontal network for compensation purposes. The end result is that
the “full infrastructure cost” can now be considered. This will definitely enlarge
the domain of charges that need to be covered by the compensation mechanism.
This has no impact on the structure of our model of ETSO’s proposals. But it
has on the domain covered by the parameters of the model.
Principle 5 mandates that TSOs pass these costs to users of the national sys-
tem. The way this should be done has been the subject of intense discussion in
the Florence Regulatory Forum. Recent documents [24] indicate that the issue
is not fully settled yet. Principle 6 argues that the compensation mechanism
is only driven by accounting considerations without any economic objectives.
Interestingly enough, ETSO’s language sometimes refers to location signals and
hence expresses economic concerns. Because our model neglects losses; we dis-
regard principle 7 from now on and concentrate on the other points.
Summing up, the idea is that a “compensation for transit will be provided
in the form of inter-TSO payments as a result of a future Cross-Border Trade
mechanism.” [24]. This inter-TSO payment requires answering three questions
namely (a) finding the costs incurred by TSO’s hosting transits, (b) identifying
the relative contribution to these costs by exporting and importing TSOs and
(c) transposing these costs into national tariffs.
a. The costs incurred by “TSOs hosting transits”. In order to identify
these costs, ETSO developed the notion of horizontal network as the part of
the grid where flows are significantly affected by transit. The organisation of
Transmission Operators then proceeded to estimate the embedded cost of the
horizontal network and to allocate a fraction of this cost to transit flows. This
process is documented in [16, 17, 22]. It resulted in what was referred to as
a compensation fund [22] estimated to an annual 200 Millions Euros. A more
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sophisticated approach, to be developed in the future, is hinted in [31]. In this
method, each TSO would try to assess the impact of transit on its network
costs in Euro/MWh terms. Depending on how this amount is computed the
end result could be a Long Run Average Incremental Cost or a more elaborate
allocated cost. In the absence of any further information, and taking stock of
ETSO’s general reasoning, we stick to the cost allocation interpretation in this
paper. However, we note in passing without elaborating that the application
of Long Run Average Incremental Cost would lead to a model endowed with
better mathematical properties.
b. The relative contribution to these costs by exporting and import-
ing TSOs. Quoting the Florence Regulatory Forum [31], “The temporary
system proposed by ETSO in September 2001, contains an underlying assump-
tion that all export/import flows of electricity in the EC have an equal effect in
terms of transit flows, i.e. contributions to the fund are directly proportionate
to measured physical inflows/outflows and programmed exports. . . ”. Taking
stock of this implicit assumption, each TSO contributes to the fund accord-
ing to a priori given coefficients identical for all TSOs. “It has been proposed
that the contributions to the fund will be made by TSOs in two parts reflect-
ing different allocation keys: (i) in relation to declared exports, which would
be collected through a specific charge imposed only on those operators which
have the responsibility for export flows, (ii) in relation to net flows, defined as
the countries net flow in export and import directions. Contribution would be
collected from consumption (L).” The exact mechanism is stated in section 5.4.
As to the future “A more accurate method would be to work out, as accurately
as possible and for each Member State, the actual amount and path of transit
flows caused by a unit of electricity exported and/or imported from/into the
Member State in question. The objective would be to establish for each zone
a transit impact coefficient for both exports and imports from that zone. The
contribution of each TSO to the compensation fund would then be established
on the basis of two elements: the physical export and import flows and the
transit impact coefficient”. This extension amounts to a change of allocation
rule that can easily be imbedded in our current model. Combined with the
Long Run Average Incremental Cost measure of transit costs, these coefficients
would lead to a model where each TSO would be charged the Long Run Aver-
age Incremental Cost that it implies on the other TSOs. Again, we mention in
passing that this model would be endowed with better mathematical properties
than the current modelling of average cost pricing.
c. The transposition of these costs in national tariffs and the general
structure of these tariffs. This third question has been most contentious.
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The controversy is reflected in the two contradictory statements taken from [24].
Consider first the principle that “transmission tariffs shall consist of input and
exit charges (G and L) only there shall be no extra tariffs for import, export
or transit: a consequence of the previous principle is that import, export and
transit tariffs, or fees payable by market players, will be abolished”. This is to be
contrasted with “As the result of many compromises, an export fee is included
and provides a location signal to a certain degree” [24]. The contradiction
between these two statements can be resolved by noting that ETSO wishes
to get rid of the export charge by introducing location charges to consumers
and generators but has not yet found the way to do so. In the meantime, an
export charge will continue to play the role of this location signal. We therefore
insert an export charge in our model. Besides this basic controversy on the
export charge, considerable divergence remains among Member States on the
allocation of these charges between consumers and generators: “Today national
transmission tariffs differ widely. Generators in some countries pay a significant
G, whereas others pay nothing. Transmission tariffs in most countries are of the
postage stamp type, but some others use more cost-reflective models. These
differences result in unequal competition conditions and distort the electricity
market. Greater harmonisation could help to level the European playing field.
It is more important to harmonise G than L, as generators compete on the
common market. There is no consensus today within ETSO regarding such
harmonisation but two alternatives are under discussion. There are to fix a
Europe-wide level for G, or to harmonise charging principles”. We retain for
the sake of our model that it is important to be able to model different allocation
of network costs into charges to generators (G) and consumers (L). Specifically
the capability to computationally assess the distortion of competition that would
result from leaving the determination of these charges to subsidiarity is of the
essence.
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4 Congestion, Transfer Capacities
and their Allocation
Congestion cost occurs when an equipment of the grid is used at maximal ca-
pacity. Congestion may originate in different phenomena. The simplest most
commonly mentioned one is the thermal limit of the lines, but the unavailability
of certain services (reactive power or spinning reserve in some region) can also
lead to congestion. As indicated in the introduction and consistent with ETSO’s
work, we essentially neglect congestion in the domestic systems and concentrate
on limitations of flows on the interconnection. The Forum suggests that these
limitations be ruled through the allocation of transfer capacities.
ETSO devoted a lot of attention to the definition and analysis of transfer
capacities. The draft regulation also invokes transfer capacities and recommends
that they be allocated through market mechanisms. The inadequacy of the
notion of transfer capacity is elaborated in Boucher and Smeers [1] and alluded
to in several early documents of the organisation. These drawbacks have since
also been pointed out in [36].
In April 2001, ETSO introduced a proposal for coordinated auction that
relies on a new definition of transmission capacities [20]. It further empha-
sised this new proposal in various papers published at the occasion of the
February 2002 meeting of the Florence Regulatory Forum. The concept is
most easily understood by referring to the US notion of flow gate implicitly
introduced by Chao and Peck in 1996 [6] and since extensively elaborated
(see http://www.ksg.harvard.edu/hepg/flowgate.htm). ETSO’s proposal is
based on two principles: (i) one can define the (aggregate) transmission capacity
(individual line capacity in the US flow gate interpretation) of the interconnec-
tion between two adjacent control areas; (ii) using Power distribution factors
(PDF) one can associate to each transmission transaction a bundle of uses of
these transmission capacities. It is then possible to organise an auction where
all market players simultaneously bid for bundles of rights of each transmission
capacity. The difference between the April 2001 and ETSO’s former auction
proposals is twofold. First it is recognised that loop flows mandate that each
transmission transaction be decomposed into a bundle of rights on the trans-
mission capacities. Second the bundle of these rights needs to be procured
simultaneously by a joint auction on all transmission capacities. With respect
to the US flow gate debate a first difference is that ETSO does not find it neces-
sary to introduce a real time market to financially settle imbalances with respect
to the forward market. Even though this may be seen as a major flaw, we dis-
regard the issue of a real time market altogether in this paper and concentrate
on the sole forward market. A second difference is that ETSO uses aggregate
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flow gates instead of the “few commercially significant flow gates” (see the Ruff-
Oren correspondence in http://www.ksg.harvard.edu/hepg/flowgate.htm).
Very much like the assumption that one can limit oneself to a few commer-
cially significant flow gate remains to be proved in the US, ETSO has not yet
assessed the feasibility of constructing aggregate flow gates. We shall not get
into this question in this paper where we simply assume that ETSO’s proposal
is viable, that is: we assume that (i) one can a priori compute the transmission
capacity of each interconnection in the sense defined by article 6 of the Draft
Regulation [12]; (ii) one can allocate these transmission capacities in a forward
market without at the same time implementing a real time market where im-
balances between the two markets are settled, and (iii) this allocation can be
done through a multi-unit auction.
The allocation of transfer capacity through an auction creates revenue for the
transmission operators. The exact use of this revenue is not fully determined
yet. But several principles can be found in the Forum documents as well as
in the Regulation proposal. Specially, the proceeds from the auction cannot
create an additional revenue for the TSO; they should be used for goals such
as reinforcing the firmness of transmission capacities firm, or the expansion of
the network. We do not get into the representation of the use of congestion
revenues in this model.
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5 A Stylised Model of the EU System
5.1 General Notation
We introduce the following set of notations for the problem description. Let
g ∈ G the set of Generators
c ∈ C the set of Customers
r ∈ R the set of Regions (geographical areas)
The following subsets can easily be understood: we denote by Gr and Cr the
subsets of generators and customers located in region r. Because some markets
remain captive or are only partially open to competition, we denote by Gc the
subset of generators allowed to supply customer c, and by Cg the subset of
customers supplied by generator g.
5.2 The Customers
The demand functions of the final consumers are assumed to be linear. They
are defined in inverted form
pcg(q
c) = αc −
∑
k∈Gc
βcg,kq
c
k (1)
where qc is the array of variables qcg , representing the supply of producer g to
customer c. Parameters α and β are non-negative constants.
Relation (1) implies that (a) the supply price to a given customer c could
differ according to the supplier, which accounts for product differentiation, and
(b) that supply to this customer by any generator could influence the price of
all other generators.
In order to derive a utility function for each customer, we consider the (in-
verted) demand functions to be the first-order derivative of the utility function.
This requires the demand system for a given customer to be integrable. This
property is satisfied if and only if the matrix of coefficients βcg,k is symmetric
with respect to indices g and k. Then the utility function of customer c is given
by :
U c(qc) =
∑
g∈Gc
αcqcg − 12
∑
g,k∈Gc
qcgβ
c
g,kq
c
k (2)
The amount to be paid by this customer is equal to
Ec(qc) =
∑
g∈Gc
pcg(q
c)qcg =
∑
g∈Gc
αcqcg −
∑
g,k∈Gc
qcgβ
c
g,kq
c
k (3)
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and its consumer surplus will therefore be given by the quadratic form :
CSc(qc) = U c(qc)− Ec(qc) = 12
∑
g,k∈Gc
qcgβ
c
g,kq
c
k (4)
We make the usual concavity assumption on the utility function U . The con-
cavity of U implies the concavity of CS.
5.3 The Producer
Let us decompose the generation cost into a fixed, a linear cost and a quadratic
cost of its sales to different agents. The generation costs could be described by
the function
CGg(qg) = Kg +
∑
c∈Cg
vccgq
c
g +
1
2
∑
c,l∈Cg
qcgω
c,l
g q
l
g (5)
In addition to these costs, producer g will also have to pay for two vertical
network access charges for (a) injecting in the local grid (the G-component), and
(b) supplying its customers in their respective region (the L-component). Let
agr and alr respectively denote the generation and customer charges. Although
the principles are that customers themselves should pay for the customer charge
alr, it is equivalent from a modelling perspective to charge it to the producer.
Producer g will also have to pay a possible cross-border fee for all exports,
and finally a congestion fee if he uses saturated transfer capacities when sup-
plying a given customer. Let xcg and τ
c
g be the cross-border fee for exports, and
the congestion charge for fully used lines, respectively. These charges (access,
cross-border and congestion) are introduced by the current regulation proposal.
Then the transmission costs for generator g are
CTg(qg) =
∑
c∈Cg
(agr|g∈Gr + alr′|c∈Cr′ + x
c
g + τ
c
g )× qcg (6)
where r|g∈Gr denotes the area of generation and r′|c∈Cr′ the area of delivery
for customer c. The revenues of the generator can easily be obtained by the
quadratic relation :
Rg(q) =
∑
c∈Cg
pcg(q
c)qcg =
∑
c∈Cg
(
αcqcg −
∑
k∈Gc
qcgβ
c
g,kq
c
k
)
(7)
It is important here to note that this relation includes supplies from other pro-
ducers on all markets. The benefits of generator g can now be stated as :
pig(q) = Rg(q)− CGg(qg)− CTg(qg) (8)
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5.4 Transmission
ETSO proposal divides the transmission network in a horizontal and a vertical
network. We will use a simplified representation here accounting for intra-
regional transmission on the one hand, and cross-border exchanges on the other
hand. We assume that both types of transactions impact some costs to the
network operator. We assume a simple linear relation for the network cost
function. Let this cost function in region r be described by the relation :
NCr(q) = F r +
∑
(g,c)∈Tr
nccr,g × (f cr,gqcg) (9)
where Tr represents the set of transactions (g, c) which impact on the trans-
mission network in area r, and f cr,g is the power distribution factor of a given
transaction on the network in area r. This distribution factor is equal to one
for all transactions implying a local customer and/or generator, but might be
smaller for pure transit. We assume that every MWh flowing through region r
due to a transaction from g to c entails a cost nccr,g.
Note that this expression allows one to work with all mechanisms (current
and foreseen) envisaged by ETSO for the compensation fund. The network cost
can indeed be set fixed or a priori determined, by limiting oneself to the first
term of relation (9). A network cost expressed in EUR/MWh is obtained by
only using the second term. Our model adopts the more general expression
where a variable non linear network cost needs to be paid for by transmission
transactions.
The revenues of the network operator (TSO) are twofold. First, the operator
in each region collects access charges agr and alr for each generator and customer
located in its control area. Second, it obtains from the Cross-Border Trade
Compensation Mechanism (ETSO) a share θr of the total compensation fund
CF collected on all export transactions. Let X represent the set of all cross-
border transactions (whatever the concerned areas) and x be the uniform export
tax, the revenues of the local TSO are given by:
Mr(q) =
∑
g∈Gr
c∈Cg
agrq
c
g +
∑
c∈Cr
g∈Gc
alrq
c
g + θr × CF. (10)
The Compensation Fund is obtained from the tax on all cross-border transac-
tions :
CF =
∑
g,c
xcgq
c
g, with
{
xcg = x, ∀(g, c) ∈ X
xcg = 0, ∀(g, c) /∈ X
(11)
where the export tax, xcg, is set to zero for intra-regional transactions. Cross-
border transactions contribute to the compensation fund via the export tax,
as in equation (11). We can think of this expression in two ways, depending
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on whether CF or x is be fixed a priori. The share θr of the compensation
fund which is to be recovered by operator r is defined by the following set of
relations. We first compute the portion XTCr(q) of local network costs NCr(q)
which is deemed due to transit. Denoting by Ir and Or the measured net flows
on interconnections of region r in import and export directions, respectively,
ETSO [17] proposes two approaches to compute the transit costs:
A. XTCr(q) =
Min(Ir;Or)∑
c∈Cr
qcg +Min(Ir;Or)
×NCr(q)
B. XTCr(q) = Ir +Or∑
c∈Cr
qcg + Ir +Or
×NCr(q)
(12)
The fraction in the right-hand side of these relations, defines the volume-based
portion of network cost which are attributed to transit. In alternative A, this
portion is based on transits through the horizontal network of region r, whereas
alternative B is based on global Cross-Border exchanges using the horizontal
network in this area. The Compensation Fund will be redistributed between
TSOs proportionally to their respective “transit” costs XTCr(q), using the
repartition key θr defined by :
θr =
XTCr(q)∑
sXTCs(q)
(13)
The profit of the local TSO can now be expressed by the following relation :
NPr(q) = θr × CF +
∑
g∈Gr
c∈Cg
agrq
c
g +
∑
c∈Cr
g∈Gc
alrq
c
g −
∑
g,c
nccr,gf
c
r,gq
c
g − F r (14)
Note that this formulation of the cross-border mechanism, although faithful to
the tariff published by ETSO [17], goes beyond the temporary tariff which was
actually implemented from March 2002 on. In the latter, the compensation fund
CF has been estimated a priori at 200 million Euros, the export tax has been
fixed a priori to 1 Euro per MWh (estimated on past historical net flows – the
balance needed to reach the 200 millions being collected through “socialisation
in the national tariff of the different countries”: this is not clear from ETSO
documents, and has not been modelled here), and only the share XTCr(q) of
network costs accounting for compensation is computed on real flows.
The model presented here allows for several variants of the proposed regu-
lation :
• the costs imputable to transit may be estimated a priori (exogenous value,
denoted XTCr) or may be the result of actual flows at the equilibrium
(endogenous value XTCr(q)),
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• the amount required for the compensation fund may be computed a priori
(denoted CF : this is the case in the current ETSO proposal, where the
compensation fund has been estimated at 200 Million Euros), or be the
result of the collection of export taxes at some predetermined level x (for
instance one Euro per MWh), or might still be the result of an equilibrium
to cover exactly the sum of costs imputable to transit XTCr.
Any combination of these two choices may be fitted in the model. Mathemati-
cally, we may summarise these possible combinations in table 1:
A priori XTCr Endogenous XTCr(q)
Fixed
CF =
∑
(g,c)∈X
xqcg CF =
∑
(g,c)∈X
xqcg
Compensation θr =
XTCr∑
r′ XTCr′
θr =
XTCr(q)∑
r′ XTCr′(q)
Fund Compensation:
θr × CF
Compensation:
θr × CF
Fixed
CF =
∑
(g,c)∈X
xqcg CF =
∑
(g,c)∈X
xqcg
Export θr =
XTCr∑
r′ XTCr′
θr =
XTCr(q)∑
r′ XTCr′(q)
Tax Compensation:
θr × CF
Compensation:
θr × CF
Cost-based
CF =
∑
(g,c)∈X
xqcg CF =
∑
(g,c)∈X
xqcg
Compensation θr =
XTCr∑
r′ XTCr′
θr =
XTCr(q)∑
r′ XTCr′(q)
Fund Compensation:
XTCr = θr × CF
Compensation:
XTCr(q) = θr × CF
Table 1: Combinations of Compensations for Transit
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6 The Market Equilibrium Problem
Suppose the regulator has decided upon the value of the charge for accessing its
local customers. All rules of the markets are then well specified, which allows
one to specify a market simulation model. This model is referred to as the
Second-Stage Equilibrium problem. It is modelled as follows.
We assume the generators are trying to maximise their own profit, possibly
subject to regulatory rules on both the captive and eligible markets. We as-
sume that, as soon as two generators are entitled to supply a single customer
segment (eligible market), there should be no price regulation and no discrim-
ination in the access charge. On the contrary, for captive customers, only one
generator is allowed to supply them. In order to avoid monopolistic prices,
one should apply a regulated pricing scheme. In the following, we will succes-
sively consider the application of Profit Maximisation, Price Caps, Long Run
Incremental Costs, and various types of Fully Distributed Costs. We derive the
second-stage equilibrium conditions for every market segment, according to the
retained regulation rule.
For each legal pair generator-customer (denoted (g, c) and such that g ∈ Gc),
we will write a second-stage equilibrium relation emphasising the local access
charge (considered as given in the second-stage equilibrium). Depending on the
regulation, the relation might take several shapes. In some cases it is possible to
analytically invert the equilibrium model, obtaining the equilibrium quantities
as a function of the access charges, but this is not true in general. To avoid too
heavy notations, we adopt the following convention :
acg = agr| g ∈ Gr + alr′ | c ∈ Gr
′
(15)
In other words, we group in a single variable, acg, the sum of injection charge
in the originating region and withdrawal charge in the delivery region. These
regions might be the same.
6.1 Competition on the Eligible Market
First consider the case of customers who may be supplied by several competitors,
possibly providing differentiated products (reliability, voltage control, interrup-
tions, etc.). Consider equation (1), describing the demand function of customer
c for power from generator g.
The differentiation is obtained through matrix βc. We have mentioned in
section 5.2 that this matrix needs be symmetric in order for the welfare function
to be computed. Further, if all coefficients βcg,k are identical for each legal pair
(g, k), then there is no differentiation between products. Let us consider the
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profit function for generator g. The profit is defined by the revenues of the
power sales, minus generation and transmission costs.
pig(q) =
∑
c∈Cg
pcg(q
c)qcg −
∑
c∈Cg
(acg + x
c
g + τ
c
g )× qcg
−
(
Kg +
∑
c∈Cg
vccgq
c
g +
∑
c,l∈Cg
qcgω
c,l
g q
l
g
)
(16)
In order for this profit to be maximised, we write the first-order equilibrium
conditions on each of the supplied markets. These conditions involve the profit
derivatives :
∀c ∈ Cg : ∂pig
∂qcg
(q) =
pcg(qc) + ∂pcg∂qcg qcg +
∑
k 6=g
k∈Gc
∂pcg
∂qck
∂qck
∂qcg
qcg

− (acg + xcg + τ cg )−
(
vccg +
∑
l∈Cg
ωc,lg q
l
g
)
(17)
Note that some partial derivatives still remain in this expression. This leaves
place for modelling different types of market power.
Market power is partially captured through the partial derivative of the
price with respect to the generator’s own supply, and should be understood as
a measure of the generator’s awareness of its own impact on market prices. If
the generator believes it has no influence on market price, whatever its supplied
quantity, then it behaves as a price taker on this market, and this derivative
should be zero. When the generator is fully aware of its impact, this derivative
should be set to βcg,g, which is the “true” derivative of the demand function with
respect to this quantity. Here we will tackle market power through parameter
ξcg,g taking values from zero to one, and such that
∂pcg
∂qcg
= −ξcg,gβcg,g, ξcg,g ∈ [0, 1] (18)
Market power also depends on the assumed values of conjectural variation, rep-
resented by the cross-derivatives on demand, ξcg,k = ∂q
c
k/∂q
c
g. This derivative
accounts for the anticipation of the competitor’s move after a change in supply
from a generator. Setting this value to zero assumes no reaction from com-
petitors. This is the definition of the Cournot equilibrium. Setting the values
such that their sum equals −1 leads to a price war, equivalent to the Bertrand
equilibrium. Finally, a value of +1 represents a collusive equilibrium.
To sum up, market power is captured through two parameters: ξcg,g taking
values between 0 and +1, accounts for generator’s awareness of its own influence
on price; parameters ξcg,k valued between −1 and +1 represents a tuning of the
type of competition between generators g and k on market c.
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The profit first-order derivative should now be rewritten as
∂pig
∂qcg
(q) = αc −
∑
k∈Gc
βcg,kq
c
k +
(∑
k∈Gc
ξcg,kβ
c
g,k
)
qcg
− (acg + xcg + τ cg )−
(
vccg +
∑
l∈Cg
ωc,lg q
l
g
)
(19)
where the inverse demand function p(q) has been fully expanded. Note that we
explicitly consider the generator to be price-taker with respect to both the local
access charge and the export tax. If profit maximisation is the generator’s ob-
jective, the first-order equilibrium conditions can be stated, in complementarity
form, as :
∂pig
∂qcg
≤ 0, qcg ≥ 0, qcg ×
∂pig
∂qcg
= 0. (20)
Reformulating slightly the first of these conditions in order to isolate the (total)
access charge acg, we obtain the following relations :
acg ≥ αc − xcg − τ cg −
∑
k∈Gc
βcg,kq
c
k − (
∑
k∈Gc
ξcg,kβ
c
g,k)q
c
g
−vccg −
∑
l∈Cg
ωc,lg q
l
g (21)
And this should reduce to an equality when the supplied quantity qcg is strictly
positive. Remarkably enough, if all customers within a region were left to com-
petition, then this would boil down to a linear system of equations.
6.2 The Captive Market
This section is dedicated to customers which may only be supplied by a single
generator. This assumption simplifies the demand system for those customers,
since the matrix βcg,k reduces to a single element. Regulatory mechanisms may
however be extended to customers supplied by a limited number of generators,
subject to some regulation rule. A quick overview of the latter extension is
provided in section 6.3.
6.2.1 Profit Maximisation on the Captive Market
In a methodological sense, this is equivalent to competition on an eligible mar-
ket, where only one generator is allowed to supply the captive customer. The
first summation in equation (21) hence reduces to a single term. Further, we
may reasonably assume that a captive customer will have a strictly positive
consumption, and therefore replace the inequality in the first-order condition
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by an equality. This yields the following relation:
acg = α
c − xcg − τ cg − (1 + ξcg,g)βcg,gqcg − vccg −
∑
l∈Cg
ωc,lg q
l
g (22)
6.2.2 Price Cap
Here we replace the profit maximisation relations by a Lagrangian. Assume the
regulator imposes the price cannot exceed pc for customer c. The Lagrangian
function can be written as:
Lg(q, µcg) = pig(q) + µ
c
g × (pcg − pcg) (23)
And the first-order condition leads to the following relations :
qcg ≥ 0,
∂Lg
∂qcg
≤ 0, qcg ×
∂Lg
∂qcg
= 0
µcg ≥ 0, pcg ≤ pcg, µcg × (pcg − pcg) = 0. (24)
Assuming again that captive customers will not have a zero-consumption, the
first set of complementarity constraints boils down to the following equation:
acg = α
c − xcg − τ cg − βcg,g(1 + ξcg,g)(qcg − µcg)−
∑
l∈Cg
ωc,lg q
l
g (25)
The complementarity constraint on the slack does however remain.
6.2.3 Long-Run Incremental Cost
This is definitely the simplest pricing scheme. By definition, the price is imposed
equal to the marginal cost of supplying the customer. This equates the market
equilibrium price with the derivative of the generator’s cost function. Therefore
we obtain the relation :
pcg(q
c) = acg + x
c
g + τ
c
g + vc
c
g +
∑
l∈Cg
ωc,lg q
l
g (26)
from which we immediately derive the inverse demand function for accessing
the network:
acg = α
c − βcg,gqcg − xcg − τ cg − vccg −
∑
l∈Cg
ωc,lg q
l
g (27)
Again we made the assumption that strictly positive quantities may lead to a
feasible solution. Such a feasible solution will not be achieved if αc < xcg + τ
c
g +
vccg, that is, if the cumulated export tax and congestion fee, plus the linear part
of the variable production cost, exceed the willingness to pay for the first MWh
of this customer.
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6.2.4 Fully Distributed Cost
Fully Distributed Costs allow a regulator to identify each source of costs for
the generator, and to allocate them between various customers. This is an easy
task for access charges, export taxes, congestion fees and linear variable costs.
But it is not that simple for fixed cost, and might even get worse for quadratic
costs. Looking at the following costs splitting,
CGg(qg) + CTg(qg) =
∑
c∈Cg
[
(acg + τ
c
g + x
c
g + vc
c
g)q
c
g +
1
2ω
c,c
g (q
c
g)
2
]
+ Kg + 12
∑
c,l∈Cg
c 6=l
qcgω
c,l
g q
l
g (28)
we may observe that the first sum accounts for all variable costs which can be
separately charged to each customer, while the last line represent non-customer
related or mixed-customers costs which have to be allocated in some way.
Several allocation rules can be proposed. We will consider here the classical
quantity-based, revenue-based and cost-proportional allocation rules.
The pricing rule for regulated customers becomes:
pcg(q
c) = acg + τ
c
g + x
c
g + vc
c
g +
1
2ω
c,c
g q
c
g + ψ
c
g(qg) (29)
where ψcg(qg) stands for the contribution to common costs. According to the
retained regulatory rule, this share is computed by:
Quantity-based Fully Distributed Costs
ψcg(qg) =
(
Kg + 12
∑
c 6=l
qcgω
c,l
g q
l
g
)
× 1∑
l∈Cg q
l
g
(30)
Revenue-based Fully Distributed Costs
ψcg(qg) =
(
Kg + 12
∑
c 6=l
qcgω
c,l
g q
l
g
)
× p
c
g(qc)∑
l∈Cg p
l
g(ql)× qlg
(31)
Cost-Proportional Fully Distributed Costs
ψcg(qg) =
(
Kg + 12
∑
c 6=l
qcgω
c,l
g q
l
g
)
× [vc
c
g +
1
2ω
c,c
g q
c
g]∑
l∈Cg [vc
l
g +
1
2ω
l,l
g qlg]× qlg
(32)
These rules lead to non-linear relations between the regional access charges and
the equilibrium quantities. Trying to explicit these relations, however, we get
the following equations :
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Quantity-based Fully Distributed Costs
acg = α
c − τ cg − xcg − vccg −
(
βcg,gq
c
g +
1
2ω
c,c
g q
c
g
)
−
(
Kg + 12
∑
c 6=l
qcgω
c,l
g q
l
g
)
× 1∑
l∈Cg q
l
g
(33)
Revenue-based Fully Distributed Costs
acg = α
c − τ cg − xcg − vccg −
(
βcg,gq
c
g +
1
2ω
c,c
g q
c
g
)
−
(
Kg + 12
∑
c 6=l
qcgω
c,l
g q
l
g
)
× p
c
g(qc)∑
l∈Cg p
l
g(ql)× qlg
(34)
Cost-Proportional Fully Distributed Costs
acg = α
c − τ cg − xcg − vccg −
(
βcg,gq
c
g +
1
2ω
c,c
g q
c
g
)
−
(
Kg + 12
∑
c 6=l
qcgω
c,l
g q
l
g
)
× [vc
c
g +
1
2ω
c,c
g q
c
g]∑
l∈Cg [vc
l
g +
1
2ω
l,l
g qlg]× qlg
(35)
As can be seen, these expressions rapidly become heavily non-linear, which
makes derivatives of such equilibrium conditions very difficult to manipulate.
6.3 Customers with several Regulated Suppliers
In the stylised model described in section 5, we consider in some regions that
several local generation companies might be allowed to supply the domestic
market, while the latter remains closed to supplies from outside the region.
Local regulators may wish to impose some rules on the regional oligopoly. The
implementation of these rules is an extension of section 6.2’s results. If no
regulation is retained, then the situation would be equivalent to the competition
depicted for the eligible market, with a restricted number of competitors, hence
we will not elaborate any further on this. We focus here on generalisation of
price caps, long-run incremental cost and fully distributed costs pricing schemes.
6.3.1 Price Cap
Let c denote the regulated customer segment having at least two possible sup-
pliers. Let pcg be the regulated maximal price for producer g (we assume that
it is the regulator’s responsibility to adequately design the possibly different
values of the caps). The Lagrangian function for each producer can be written
as:
∀g ∈ Gc : Lg(q, µcg) = pig(q) + µcg × (pcg − pcg) (36)
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The first-order condition for each generator g ∈ Gc states :
qcg ≥ 0,
∂Lg
∂qcg
≤ 0, qcg ×
∂Lg
∂qcg
= 0 (37)
µcg ≥ 0, pcg ≤ pcg, µcg × (pcg − pcg) = 0. (38)
Here we may not assume anymore that deliveries from all allowed generators g
to the regulated customer c will be strictly positive. It is therefore necessary
to resort to the complementarity formulation of the first-order condition (37).
Let σcg denote the slack for this constraint. We now have the following set of
conditions:
acg = αc−xcg−τ cg−
∑
l∈Cg ω
c,l
g q
l
g−
∑
k∈Gc β
c
g,k
(
qck + ξ
c
g,k × (qcg − µcg)
)
+σcg
µcg ×
(
pcg − pcg
)
= 0,
σcg × qcg = 0,
µcg ≥ 0, σcg ≥ 0, qcg ≥ 0, 0 ≤ pcg ≤ pcg.
(39)
6.3.2 Long-Run Incremental Cost
Although very improbable while applying an incremental cost regulation, we
have to envisage that deliveries may possibly be zero from some generator to
the regulated customer. Pricing at long run incremental cost, according to our
formulation, is then equivalent, for any g ∈ Gc to:
pcg(q
c) ≤ acg + xcg + τ cg + vccg +
∑
l∈Cg
ωc,lg q
l
g, (40)
where the inequality should resume to an equality if quantities are strictly pos-
itive. Defining the slack variable σcg we obtain the following complementarity
system:
acg = α
c
g −
∑
k∈Gc
βcg,kq
c
k − xcg − τ cg − vccg −
∑
l∈Cg
ωc,lg q
l
g + σ
c
g
σcg × qcg = 0, σcg ≥ 0, qcg ≥ 0. (41)
Here again we observe that feasible solution may only be achieved if the cu-
mulated export tax and congestion fee, plus the linear part of the variable
production cost does not exceed the willingness to pay for the first MWh of this
customer. The present formulation now allows for zero deliveries from some
generators.
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6.3.3 Fully Distributed Costs
Here we extend the formulation which was developed in 6.2.4 to the case of
several generators, supplying a regulated customer at fully distributed costs.
The assumption of strictly positive deliveries does not hold anymore. The equi-
librium conditions may hence be rewritten using complementarity. We use the
slack variable σcg to establish the pricing rule:
pcg(q
c) = acg + τ
c
g + x
c
g + vc
c
g +
1
2ω
c,c
g q
c
g + ψ
c
g(qg)− σcg,
σcg × qcg = 0, σcg ≥ 0, qcg ≥ 0. (42)
where ψcg(qg) was defined in equations (30) to (32) according to the retained
cost distribution paradigm. The equilibrium relations now become:
σcg × qcg = 0, σcg ≥ 0, qcg ≥ 0. (43)
Quantity-based Fully Distributed Costs
acg = α
c − τ cg − xcg − vccg −
(
1
2ω
c,c
g q
c
g +
∑
k∈Gc
βcg,kq
c
k
)
+ σcg
−
(
Kg + 12
∑
c 6=l
qcgω
c,l
g q
l
g
)
× 1∑
l∈Cg q
l
g
(44)
Revenue-based Fully Distributed Costs
acg = α
c − τ cg − xcg − vccg −
(
1
2ω
c,c
g q
c
g +
∑
k∈Gc
βcg,kq
c
k
)
+ σcg
−
(
Kg + 12
∑
c 6=l
qcgω
c,l
g q
l
g
)
× p
c
g(qc)∑
l∈Cg p
l
g(ql)× qlg
(45)
Cost-Proportional Fully Distributed Costs
acg = α
c − τ cg − xcg − vccg −
(
1
2ω
c,c
g q
c
g +
∑
k∈Gc
βcg,kq
c
k
)
+ σcg
−
(
Kg + 12
∑
c 6=l
qcgω
c,l
g q
l
g
)
× [vc
c
g +
1
2ω
c,c
g q
c
g]∑
l∈Cg [vc
l
g +
1
2ω
l,l
g qlg]× qlg
(46)
Note that no solution to this equilibrium problem may be guaranteed. In some
cases, the problem might be infeasible: we discuss this topic in section 8 where
such case is met.
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6.4 The Coordinated Auction of Interconnection Capaci-
ties
In this section we define the mechanism which determines the congestion charge
τ cg for any cross-border transaction (g, c) ∈ X. We define two new parameters.
Let ICr,r′ denote the interconnection capacity from region r towards region r′ 1.
It is important to note however that these capacities could be different in one
direction or the other. Let also φcg|r,r′ denote the fraction of transaction (g, c)
flowing through interconnection (r, r′) (a power distribution factor in flow gate
parlance). For intra-regional transactions, this factor would be zero for each
interconnection, and it should be computed a priori for inter-regional transac-
tions. Note also that this distribution factor must have symmetric values, that
is, φcg|r,r′ = −φcg|r′,r.
We implement the following opportunity cost mechanism for interconnection
pricing. The congestion charge for the use of a saturated interconnection is taken
equal to the dual variable δr,r′ of the capacity constraint. Mathematically, this
expresses ∀r 6= r′ as :
δr,r′ ≥ 0,
∑
(g,c)∈X
qcgφ
c
g|r,r′ ≤ ICr,r′ ,
 ∑
(g,c)∈X
qcgφ
c
g|r,r′ − ICr,r′
 δr,r′ = 0
(47)
The latter formulation ensures that the congestion charge δr,r′ will remain at
zero as long as the interconnection from r towards r′ does not reach its capacity
limit. For any interconnection (r, r′) used by a particular transaction (g, c),
the unit contribution to congestion charges is equal to δr,r′φcg|r,r′ . The total
congestion charge incurred by this transaction is given by
τ cgq
c
g =
∑
r 6=r′
δr,r′φ
c
g|r,r′
 qcg. (48)
This mechanism ensures that, at equilibrium, each transaction (g, c) contribut-
ing to the saturation of an interconnection capacity will be penalised propor-
tionally to its own flow on the interconnection, while a transaction generating a
counterflow on a saturated interconnection would receive a contribution based
on the same rule.
1This transmission capacity can be interpreted as a flow gate in the US sense (see [6] for the
initial paper, and http://www.ksg.harvard.edu/hepg/flowgate.htm for further discussion).
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7 The Regulators’ Game
The regulators’ game consists of maximising the local welfare Wr(q) by tuning
the access charge alr to their local customers and agr to their local generators.
7.1 Regional Welfare
The regional welfare is equal to the sum of benefits of the local agents. Benefits
should be understood as profits for operators and generators, and consumer
surplus for final customers.
From the previous definitions, the regional welfare is defined by:
Wr(q) = NPr(q) +
∑
c∈Cr
CSc(qc) +
∑
g∈Gr
pig(q) (49)
The game is as follows. Depending on the customer segment, generators are
either left to competition (i.e. profit maximisation in a Cournot game), or
subject to a regulation. In each region, the local regulator selects the repartition
of access charges in order to maximise the regional welfare. This leads to a
Nash equilibrium, constrained by the conditions of the second-stage equilibrium
problem.
7.2 The Conditions for the Nash Equilibrium
Let us state the first-stage problem of each regional regulator as follows. Con-
sider the share of network costs imputable to transit, denoted XTCr(q) . It is
not clear yet from ETSO proposals how these costs will be determined exactly.
As mentioned in section 5.4, at least two proposals can be found in [17]. We
implemented both alternatives of equation (12). Whether these costs should
be computed a priori using estimates of future flows, or dynamically using the
model flows at equilibrium, is a user’s choice. In both cases, they define the
share θr of the compensation fund which will be allocated to the regional TSO
to cover its transit costs.
The regulator decides on the access charges alr and agr in such a way that
(a) the remaining network fixed costs are covered (and hence that the local
TSO’s profit is equal to zero), and (b) the regional welfare is maximised. Math-
ematically, the regulator’s problem can be stated as:
∀r ∈ R : max
alr,agr
Wr(q) =
∑
c∈Cr
CSc(qc) +
∑
g∈Gr
pig(q) (50)
s.t.
∑
g∈Gr
agrq
c
g +
∑
c∈Cr
alrq
c
g ≥ NCr(q)− θr × CF
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Note that the expression of the network operator’s profit function NPr(q) dis-
appeared from the welfare function: since part of its costs are to be covered
by the compensation fund, and that the remainder of its costs is to be covered
through access charges while maximising the regional welfare, its profit will be
zero and may therefore be removed from the objective function.
This problem however has to be solved for every regional regulator, taking
the decisions of the other regulators into account. This leads to a Nash equi-
librium. Writing the first-order equilibrium conditions for every TSO requires
explicit derivatives of regional welfare with respect to the access charge, and this
is not always possible. We therefore solve this problem, iterating on successive
regional welfare optimisations problems. This is detailed in section 8.
Let us reconsider the budget constraint in problem (50). Instead of deciding
on two access charge variables alr and agr, the regulator could review his prob-
lem as follows: let λr represent the share of the remaining costs (NCr(q)−θrCF )
to be covered through the generator access charge agr. Since it has been es-
tablished that, when maximising the welfare, the budget constraint would hold
with equality, then the problem becomes:
max
λr
Wr(q) =
∑
c∈Cr
CSc(qc) +
∑
g∈Gr
pig(q) (51)
s.t. agr =
λr∑
g∈Gr qcg
× (NCr(q)− θr × CF ) (52)
alr =
1− λr∑
c∈Cr qcg
× (NCr(q)− θr × CF ) (53)
θr =
XTCr∑
r′ XTCr′
XTCr =
{ Min(Ir;Or)Min(Ir;Or) +∑c∈Cr qcg ×NCr(q)
or
Ir +Or
Ir +Or +
∑
c∈Cr qcg
×NCr(q)
where the denominators in the two fractions are respectively the total regional
production and the total regional consumption. With the latter formulation,
there is only one decision variable for each regulator : λr. Iterating on each
regulator’s problem yields a Nash equilibrium.
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8 A Numerical Example
This last section illustrates the flexibility of the model on a stylised example.
We consider a four zones region model (two large and two small control areas)
and test the impact of several of the features discussed in the preceding section.
We show that the model reproduces expected economic known behaviours and
raises new questions. We leave the study of some of these questions on a realistic
example for further research.
8.1 Data description
We consider a stylised model comprising four regions. Regions 1 and 2 are
comparatively small with respect to regions 3 and 4. In each region r, there is
one Transmission System Operator (TSOr), one or two generation companies
(Genr), and two customer segments (Eligr is eligible and accessible to each of
the four producers, while Captr is captive and supplied by the local generator(s)
only). The four regions are linked together by interconnection capacities. Note
that we here assume two generators serving the non-eligible markets in regions
3 and 4. The situation is sketched in figure 1. Appendix A gives an extensive
description of the data. Tables and figures illustrating numerical results are
gathered in appendix B.
For the sake of simplicity, the model presented here is limited to one single
time period, for instance one single hour. Hence, quantities expressed in [GWh]
are equivalent to power in [GW] during the relevant period of time, that is, one
hour. On the other hand, fixed costs are also converted from their annual value
onto the equivalent value for the relevant period.
8.1.1 Customers Data
Customers are characterised by a linear demand function. This function is
calibrated around a reference point, associating a reference demand level qc0 to a
reference price pc0, together with a price elasticity ε
c at that point. The reference
values are given in table 2.
In order to rebuild the linear demand functions from these parameters, we
only need to remember the definition of the price elasticity at the reference
point:
εc =
p0
q0
× ∂q
c
∂pc |(q0,p0)
(54)
From this equation, we derive the slope of the linear demand function at the
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Figure 1: Stylised model
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reference point and obtain the equation:
pc = pc0
(
1− 1
εc
)
− p
c
0
εc
qc (55)
In case there is no hypothesis about product differentiation (that is, in the case
we consider all βcg,k identical for a particular customer c), then the identification
of parameters αc and βc is straightforward.
8.1.2 Generators Data
Generators are described by their generation cost function. We have seen in
section 5 that this generation cost is given by:
CGg(qg) = Kg +
∑
c∈Cg
vccgq
c
g +
1
2
∑
c,l∈Cg
qcgω
c,l
g q
l
g (56)
We will here make the simplifying assumption that, for a given generator g, the
linear variable cost vccg is the same for all its potential customers c, and that
the quadratic part of its costs ωc,lg has the same value for each pair (c, l) of
customers. Numerical data are provided in table 3, where fixed costs have been
brought down to a hourly value.
8.1.3 Network Data
Network Operators (TSOs) also incur costs. We have stated in section 5 that
their cost function is assumed to be linear, and given by the expression:
NCr(q) = F r +
∑
(g,c)∈Tr
nccr,g × (f cr,gqcg) (57)
where fixed costs are again reduced to their hourly equivalent value, and variable
transmission costs are supposed to be small in comparison to generation costs.
Moreover, variable transmission costs also depend on the power distribution
factors f cr,g indicating the fraction of a transaction from producer g to customer
c which flows through region r. Table 4 gives the relevant cost information for
TSOs.
Interconnection capacities are limited. We have chosen to implement a bi-
directional representation of interconnections, which allows for capacities to be
asymmetric. Table 6 gives the values in [MW] of the interconnection capacities.
Note the asymmetry of the capacity of the line connecting network areas 1 and
4: the maximum flow from region 4 to region 1 is four times as important as in
the opposite direction.
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Finally, power distribution factors f cr,g are implicitly defined by table 7,
which describes for any transaction from region r to region r′, the amount of
power flowing through the interconnections.
8.1.4 The Global Picture of the Model
While Eligible Customers are left to competition (possibly tuned by market
power parameters), Captive Customers may be subject to regulation. The envis-
aged regulations are listed below, together with the corresponding abbreviation
used in some result tables:
• Profit Maximisation (PROF)
• Price Cap mechanism (PCAP)
• Cost-Proportional Fully Distributed Costs (P-FDC)
• Quantity-based Fully Distributed Costs (Q-FDC)
• Revenue-based Fully Distributed Costs (R-FDC)
• Long Run Incremental Cost (LRIC)
The model has been implemented in GAMS, using CONOPT2 as non-linear
solver. Some instances of the model require the DNLP (non-linear model with
discontinuous derivatives) version of CONOPT2. This is the case when the
costs XTCr(q) deemed caused by transit are computed using alternative A of
ETSO’s proposal, since this formulation involves a minimum function.
We successively consider the three versions of the model:
- the Second-Stage Only, where the parameter defining the repartition of net-
work costs between generators and customers (λr) is fixed a priori to some
arbitrary value,
- the Nash equilibrium, where each local regulator decides individually on the
value of λr so as to maximise its local welfare, taking the choice of other
regulators as given, and
- the Cooperative equilibrium, where the total welfare is maximised by the
regulator, regardless of its repartition between agents.
For each of these three assumptions, we consider various combinations of captive
market regulation, compensation mechanisms, competitive behaviours, as well
as the sensitivity of the obtained solutions to some model parameters. Figure 2
summarises the different versions of the two-stage model.
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The First-Stage Game
2nd Stage only
∀r :
λr = λr
¹¸
º·
OR
Nash
equilibrium
∀r :
max
λr
Wr(q)
¹¸
º·
OR
Cooperative
equilibrium
max
λ1...λR
∑
r
Wr(q)
Second-Stage Equilibrium
Equilibrium Conditions on the Eligible Markets :
equations (20-21)
Equilibrium Conditions on the Captive Markets :
equations (22), (24-25), (27), (33), (34) and (39), (41), (44), (45), (46)
Auction on Interconnection Capacities :
equations (47) and (48)
Compensation Mechanism for Transit Costs :
equations (11), (12) and (13)
Access Charges to cover Network Costs :
equations (52) and (53)
Figure 2: The global picture of the model
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8.2 Second Stage Only
We first consider the version of the model where the allocation of network costs
between generators and customers is fixed to arbitrary values. Several pricing
rules are envisaged for the captive markets. This first version of the model
assumes that competition in the eligible markets is represented by a Cournot
equilibrium, where each agent is aware of its own impact on prices.
8.2.1 Profit Maximisation on Captive Markets
Tables 8 to 12, in appendix B, illustrate the numerical results for the second-
stage equilibrium, when variables λr have been fixed a priori and captive mar-
kets are left to monopolistic pricing.
We take this configuration (referred to, in the following, as the base case)
as a first reference. In this first example, the computation of transit costs
is endogenous, and these costs are to be recovered exactly by means of the
compensation fund. This corresponds to the lower-right cell of table 1 and is the
most complex mechanism, where the whole inter-TSO payment is endogenous.
We chose in a first step to use alternative B of formula (12) for the computation
of transit costs.
The repartition of access charges between customers and generators has been
fixed arbitrarily. We have assumed that network costs are entirely supported
by customers (λr = 0) except in region 3 where we have adopted the opposite
assumption. Note that the latter hypothesis is unrealistic in the sense that
the EU regulation proposal [12, Art.4.2.] requires that the highest share of the
network cost be imposed on customers. We nevertheless retain this extreme
assumption in order to illustrate some surprising effects accruing from the lack
of harmonisation of the allocation of network charges among EU countries.
The total welfare of the stylised system is equal to 3.817 million EUR for a
single-hour representation of the problem. This should be viewed as a worst case
scenario, because one does not try to optimise the regional welfare (second stage
equilibrium only), and captive customers are left to monopolistic or oligopolistic
profit maximisers.
Let us first look at the equilibrium costs and profits reported in table 8. We
may easily verify that regulated TSOs have a zero-profit. Granting generators
the right to use monopolistic or oligopolistic prices on their respective captive
customers allows them to collect huge profits. Noticeably enough, in duopoly
regions 3 and 4 (where, by data construction, generators Gen3a and Gen4a are
presumed to be dominant operators with respect to their respective competitors
Gen3b and Gen4b), the profits of the dominant generators are smaller than
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these of their competitors, although the market share of the dominant generator
remains slightly higher2.
Customers utilities and surplus do not bring much insight at this early stage
of results analysis, and are therefore not discussed at this stage. Note that in
each region (except region 3), revenues from sales exceed local power purchase.
This can be explained by the extreme hypothesis on the repartition of access
charges between generators and customers. A generator located outside region 3
has no generation charge in its own region, and no customer charge if it supplies
customers in region 3. It therefore gets a competitive advantage in region 3
on incumbent producers Gen3a and Gen3b which have to support the network
charge in their region.
Table 9 reports the equilibrium volumes delivered to each customer. The
comparison of these equilibrium values with the reference values in table 2 yields
the following : captive customers supplied by a single monopolistic generator
reach near 53% of their reference demand level, whereas captive customers sup-
plied by two competitors get close to 70% of this reference level. On the other
hand, eligible customers reach between 75 and 90% of their reference level.
Equilibrium prices, given in the lower part of table 10, range between 63 and
83 EUR/MWh for captive customers, and lie around 34 EUR/MWh for eligible
clients. This clearly illustrates the combined effect of the number of suppliers
when no specific regulation is applied, and the higher price elasticity of the
eligible customers.
Table 10 gives a quick overview of prices at the second-stage equilibrium.
Marginal generation costs are in the range of 20 to 28 EUR/MWh. There is how-
ever a noticeable difference in marginal costs between generators installed in the
same region (about 5 EUR/MWh). This difference arises from the second-stage
equilibrium conditions (21) and (22)3. Access charges, as mentioned above, are
fully supported by customers in all regions except in 3, where it is charged to
generators only. The export tax is here endogenously computed in order to cover
exactly the transit costs incurred by local TSOs. Its value of 1.27 EUR/MWh
is quite realistic.
2Simplifying the problem to two generators a and b, with respective cost functions Ki +
vc×qi+ 12ωiq2i , where i = a, b), and a single market (demand function p = α−β(qa+qb)), we
may show that at the Cournot equilibrium market shares are in the proportion qa/qb = (β +
ωb)/(β+ωa). In the numerical example, since β largely dominates both ωa and ωb in regions 3
and 4, market shares qa and qb are similar. The profit for the incumbent generator is equal to
pia = −Ka+(α−vc)2(β+0.5ωa)/(ωa+β× (2+(β+ωb)/(β+ωa))2 ≈ −Ka+(α−vc)2/(9β),
and the symmetric expression holds for generator b. Gross margins will hence also have the
same order of magnitude. The difference in profits is therefore mainly caused by the larger
fixed costs incurred by the incumbent generator.
3Considering the same example as in footnote 2, we know that at equilibrium qa and qb
are similar, but marginal costs vc+ ωiqi are not if ωa and ωb differ.
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Table 11 displays the flows on the interconnections. Every generator located
in areas 1, 2 or 4 tries to benefit from its competitive advantage in terms of access
to region 3. For this reason, both lines connecting to region 3 are saturated.
Dual values are obtained from equations (47) and can be interpreted as the
prices coming out of the auction of the interconnection capacities. This leads to
an auction value, for a supplementary MW of capacity from region 1 to region
3 (half of it flowing via region 2, the other half via region 4), of more than 7
EUR/MWh !
Finally, table 12 gives the details of the compensation mechanism under the
assumption that the Compensation Fund covers exactly the transmission costs,
through the collection of an endogenous export tax. Transmission costs being
computed on the basis of equation (12-B), we need to measure the net flows
Ir and Or respectively in the import and export directions, as well as the local
energy consumption and the local network cost. Applying the formula gives the
share of the compensation fund which will be recovered by each of the TSOs.
Note that although region 3 exclusively imports – and hence does not really
suffer transit costs – they get the largest part in the Compensation Fund. This
paradox arises from the formulation embedded in alternative B of the transit
cost estimation: any cross-border transaction using the horizontal network in
region 3 contributes to its transit costs, even if all of these transactions have
their delivery point in this region. In economic terms, this amounts to reward
region 3 which caused an externality. This is clearly an unintended consequence
of the compensation mechanism. The total Compensation Fund amounts to
39 970 Euros for a single hour model (which nearly represents 350 million Euros
on a yearly basis).
Sensitivity Analysis: the Compensation Mechanism. In section 5.4 we
have envisaged several possible combinations of compensation mechanisms (a
priori fixed fund or export tax, endogenous or exogenous transit costs, alterna-
tive computations of transit costs. . . ). Table 13 gives an overview of the changes
in the total welfare function, compensation fund and export tax, associated with
these different mechanisms. Note that alternative A of the transit cost estima-
tion does not perform very well: the problem is infeasible when we opt for a
fixed tax (each region does either only import or only export: alternative A
hence results in XTCr = 0 in all regions, making equation 13 undefined), and
it raises a very tiny compensation fund when transit costs are exactly recov-
ered (in this case, regions 1 and 3 end up with no transit costs and hence no
compensation because their respective flows are all in the same directions, i.e.
exclusively export and exclusively import, respectively). These extreme situa-
tions are partly due to the single-period representation of our stylised model.
ETSO however proposes to sum the values over each hour in the year, which
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should somewhat smoothen the effects of this paradoxical mechanism. Even
though this phenomenon may not be present in the real world, it signals that
one of the rules proposed by ETSO is inoperative in extreme conditions and
hence may have unintended effects in normal conditions.
The three different solutions obtained with a priori fixed compensation fund
(first column) do not seem to depart significantly from each other in terms of
global welfare. In contrast, the repartition of this welfare across the different
regions changes. In particular, there is a transfer of welfare from region 4 to
region 3 of about 12 thousand Euros between alternatives A and B. In short,
the selection of inter-TSO payment mechanism matters.
Sensitivity Analysis: Market Power. We get interesting variants of the
base case by tuning the market power parameters.
We can modify the assumed degree of competition between agents by chang-
ing the coefficient of conjectural variation ξcg,k(g 6= k). Setting the latter to a
value of +1 leads to a collusive equilibrium between agents. In the latter case,
all equilibrium volumes drop around 50% of the reference level. The end result
is also disastrous in terms of welfare which decreases by almost 1 million Euros
with respect to the base case. On the contrary, when set to a negative value,
the equilibrium tends towards a price war. Probably because of the difficulty of
covering the fixed charges of the network, the model does not find any feasible
solution in case of extreme price war (that is, ξcg,g = +1 and ξ
c
g,k = −0.2 for
g 6= k, such that their sum equals −1, see section 6). But solutions obtained
with intermediate values (down to -0.173 instead of the theoretical limit of -0.2)
show a significant increase in total welfare (+200 thousand Euros), while prices
charged to eligible customer segments quickly drop towards marginal prices (27
to 30 EUR/MWh) although captive customers prices remain at their level (60
to 80 EUR/MWh).
These situations are interesting and deserve more investigation; they sig-
nal conditions where the allocation mechanisms hampers the development of
competition, in this case by preventing a competitive equilibrium.
We can also play with the generator’s awareness of its own impact on market
price, by modifying the value of parameter ξcg,g. When this parameter is set to
+1, the agent is aware of the impact of its own decisions on market price.
When set to 0, it is not aware at all and behaves like a price taker. Again this
latter extreme case may lead to infeasible constraints because of the difficulty of
covering the fixed costs of the network4. Keeping compensation mechanisms as
4In this particular case, a feasible solution can only be achieved with a relaxed version of
the problem, where the compensation fund is exogenously set to zero, that is, when no com-
pensation for alleged transit cost is enforced. The increase of welfare is however considerable,
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in the base case, we get a feasible solution with values of ξcg,g down to 0.15, but
cannot go below that value. The welfare reaches 4.533 million Euros, which is
an increase of over 700 thousand Euros with respect to the base case, and prices
on all customer segments drop significantly (around 29 EUR/MWh on eligible
markets, and between 35 and 41 EUR/MWh for captive customers).
Sensitivity Analysis: Network Fixed Costs. Consider now the evolution
of the dual values on interconnection capacities, for which we try to assess their
evolution with respect to network fixed costs. To achieve this, we scale these
fixed costs from 0.1 up to 3. Figure 3 illustrates the evolution of the dual values
when network fixed costs increase. In order to plot only positive values, we
reverted the connections R1-R4 and R4-R3. Interconnection R1-R2 never gets
saturated, and hence its dual value is zero, and has therefore not been plotted.
Note that two distinct behaviours appear as fixed costs of the network increase:
on the one hand, the value of interconnections R2-R3 and R4-R3 increase con-
tinuously (up to some breakpoint) with network fixed costs. This could seem
quite surprising. However, thinking back about our access charge assumptions,
remember that transactions involving generators from regions 1, 2 or 4, to cus-
tomers in region 3, do not bear any access charge. Therefore, when network costs
increase, these “free” transactions become more and more attractive to gener-
ators, hence their willingness to pay for interconnection capacities increases as
well. On the other hand, the dual value on line R1-R4 slowly decreases until the
same breakpoint. This can be explained by the same assumption: transactions
using this interconnection involve customers in region 1 or 2. These customers
face increasing access charges when network costs grow. Hence the willingness
to pay for interconnection capacity lessens. Once the scaling factor exceeds 2.6,
line R1-R4 is not used at full capacity anymore, hence its dual value vanishes
and this brings a change in the dual values of the remaining saturated inter-
connections. The latter starts again to increase after this breakpoint, up to the
feasibility limit (reached with a scaling factor of 2.98).
8.2.2 Price Capped Profit Maximisation on Captive Markets
In this pricing rule, captive customers are protected by a regulated upper bound
on their final price. We have arbitrarily chosen to set this cap to 50 EUR/MWh.
This results in a significantly increased total welfare (488 thousand Euros
above the base case) : regions 1 and 2 increase their welfare by 30%, while in
regions 3 and 4 it raises by 10% only. The reason therefore lies in their respective
oligopolistic situation before the introduction of the price cap: monopolies are
since each customer (including captive ones) is now priced at marginal cost.
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comparatively more detrimental than duopolies in terms of welfare. Introducing
a price cap will therefore improve more on a former monopoly than on a duopoly.
This welfare improvement is not shared in the same manner by consumers
and generators: for the former, the consumer surplus largely increases on captive
markets. In contrast, monopolies dramatically reduce their profits (even though
these remain slightly positive). Duopolies’ position also change importantly.
Incumbent generators restore a higher profit than in the base case, while their
competitors see their profits collapse. Equilibrium volumes reach 83% of the
reference level (instead of 53 to 70% in the base case) on the captive markets.
Equilibrium prices lie at their cap for captive markets and remain practi-
cally unchanged with respect to the base case on eligible markets. Although
flows on interconnection capacities have not dramatically changed, the export
tax reduces from 1.27 to 1.14 EUR/MWh. The collected compensation fund
amounts to 35 800 Euros, and the share of this fund dedicated to regions 1 and
2 reduces slightly.
8.2.3 Cost-proportional Fully Distributed Cost on Captive Markets
Equilibrium relations have been stated in section 6.2.4 for captive markets. They
impose that prices on captive market remain equal to some average cost. How-
ever, it is well known that average cost pricing mechanisms do not necessarily
lead to a unique solution, neither do they guarantee the existence of a solution.
The total welfare now exceeds 4.44 million Euros, which is more than 625
thousand Euros above the base case. Each region gains around 4% anew on
its local welfare with respect to the price cap regulation, and between 14% and
38% with respect to the profit maximisation. Again, this welfare increase is
not equally distributed: captive customers see their price drop to levels ranging
between 38 and 42 EUR/MWh, while eligible customers do not see significant
changes. Generator profits, on the contrary, dramatically collapse – most of
them now incur losses. The average cost pricing mechanism reduces the profit
made on the captive market to zero (considering a given allocation of fixed
costs to this captive market) and the competition on the eligible market does
not guarantee sufficient revenues to cover the remaining fixed costs. The welfare
increase hence mainly benefits to captive customers in each region.
One important change, however, with respect to the previous situations, is
that the captive market of region 3 is exclusively supplied by generator Gen3a.
This can be explained through the non-convexity of inter-TSO compensation
and pricing mechanism on captive markets, and a different starting point may
lead to another solution5.
5Numerical experience show that this indeed is the case: starting from another initial point,
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Equilibrium volumes increase once again on the captive markets, now rang-
ing between 90 and 94% of their reference levels. Equilibrium flows only involve
eligible customers and therefore remain almost unchanged. An increase in the
local captive market consumption does however reduce the part XTCr(q) of
network costs deemed to be due to transit and hence also reduces the total
required compensation fund. This is the reason why the export tax drops once
again, reaching 1.09 EUR/MWh, collecting a total amount of 34 200 Euros for
the compensation fund. The shares θr of this compensation fund dedicated to
each TSO do not change importantly with respect to the base case.
8.2.4 Quantity-based Fully Distributed Cost on Captive Markets
Here the common costs of each generator are allocated proportionally to its
supplies. Again, neither the existence nor the uniqueness of a solution may be
guaranteed.
The solution to this particular version of the problem is very similar to the
previous instance, since the ratio of captive market deliveries to total generation
is very close to the ratio of captive market direct generation costs to total direct
generation costs. In fact, the values of variable ψcg(qg) in formulations (30) and
(32) do not differ significantly from the numerical data used in this example.
The total welfare, reaching 4.45 million Euros, is very slightly higher than
in the case of Cost-Proportional FDC. The volumes at equilibrium also very
slightly increase. The export tax remains at the same level and the compensation
fund reaches 34 000 Euros.
8.2.5 Revenue-based Fully Distributed Cost on Captive Markets
From a computational point of view, this regulatory rule is probably the most
difficult to solve because the inherent non-convexities of all involved functions.
We do get a solution which is quite close to those obtained in the two previously
discussed Fully Distributed Costs. In this case though, the captive customers
in region 3 are being supplied by both their local generators.
Compared to the other FDC rules, the total welfare is somewhat reduced. It
drops to 4.43 million Euros, and this loss is mainly incurred in region 3, where
generator Gen3b is back on the local captive market. Captive customer prices
now rise up to 45 EUR/MWh in the latter region. The export tax is here 1.11
Eur/MWh and the total fund now amounts to 34 500 Euros for compensation.
one ends up with an equilibrium where both generators supply their internal market, but the
global welfare is poorer.
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Sensitivity Analysis: the Generation Fixed Costs. Generators incur
fixed costs which have to be allocated according to some well-defined procedure
in cost-allocation rules. An increase of these fixed costs may make it difficult to
find solutions to our problem.
This happens, for instance, when raising every generator’s fixed costs by
50%. The problem becomes infeasible. This is not really a model issue but
results from the need to allocate a large fixed cost. To overcome this issue, and
nevertheless provide an insight into the problem, we introduce supplementary
slacks in the equilibrium constraint (34), and solve the model with very high
penalties on those tolerated violations. This is equivalent to searching for a
feasible solution which departs in the least possible way from the covering of
the fixed costs by the assumed allocation rule.
The end result is a solution where the welfare is seriously downgraded. It
barely reaches 3.1 million Euros, that is, a decrease of the welfare by 1.33
million Euros, when the increase of generator fixed costs is “only” of 1.03 million
Euros, the net loss hence comes close to 300 thousand Euros. Generators incur
more losses with respect to the base case than customers increase their surplus.
Equilibrium price do not change on the eligible markets, but come close to 60
EUR/MWh for captive customers.
8.2.6 Incremental Cost on Captive Markets
Incremental cost is the paradigm of economic efficiency. It does however not
cover fixed costs incurred by operators, but maximises the total welfare. The im-
plementation of Incremental Cost pricing leads to a total welfare of 4.53 million
Euros, which represents an increase of 715 thousands with respect to the profit
maximisation case. Only captive customers are priced with long-run incremen-
tal cost, however, which leads to a strange equilibrium where captive customer
prices (ranging from 26 to 30 EUR/MWh) are lower than for eligible customers
(which now lie in nearer to 35 EUR/MWh) that face imperfect competition.
All generators incur losses, since they cannot recover their fixed costs any-
more on captive markets. Demand on the latter now reach 102 to 106% of their
reference level. The export tax equals 1.05 EUR/MWh, for a total compensa-
tion fund of 32 500 Euros. The respective share θr of the Fund, recovered by
each TSO, does not fundamentally change with respect to the base case.
8.3 Nash equilibrium between Regulators
Allowing the regulators to optimise their local welfare non-cooperatively leads
to a Nash equilibrium (if any). Tables 14 and 15 summarise the main values
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observed. As can be seen, equilibrium prices are barely affected by this move
to a two-stage problem. However, observing the total welfare when moving to
Nash equilibrium, we see that it improves by at least 20 thousand Euros (in
P-FDC) to 35 thousand Euros (in PROF) with respect to the “second-stage
only” welfare.
The Compensation Fund is also generally higher at the Nash equilibrium
than at the corresponding “second-stage only” equilibrium. The intuitive rea-
soning therefore is that when each local regulator optimises separately its own
welfare, it will try to get the largest possible share θr from the Compensation
Fund. The solution at this equilibrium therefore shows flows Ir and Or which
are more important than in the “second-stage only problem”.
Figure 4 illustrates the evolution of dual values of saturated interconnec-
tion capacities in the case of Profit Maximisation, when network fixed costs
are scaled from 0 to 3.6 times their reference value. Comparing this graph to
figure 3, we observe a new behaviour: not only are the dual values smaller (in
absolute value) than in the “second-stage only” model, but they also show a
more chaotic behaviour. The changes in slope of the different curves coincides,
as we will detail in subsection 8.4 dealing with cooperative behaviour, with
structural changes in the corresponding evolution of access charges at one or
the other end of the interconnection.
It is not obvious from table 15 that access to the network should be preferen-
tially charged to generators or customers in the case of Nash equilibrium. One
may however note that customers support a non-zero charge in almost every
region and regulatory choice. Generators are left free of access charge in regions
1 and 3, but support the largest part of network costs in regions 2 and 4. While
generators in region 4 are not very affected by this change, the profit of Gen2
drops by 3 to 10 thousand Euros, depending on the regulation on the captive
market.
8.4 Cooperative equilibrium between Regulators
Moving one step further towards welfare optimisation, we choose now to look
at the total welfare, over all four regions, instead of independently optimising
local welfare. We should therefore, in each scenario of regulation, obtain a total
welfare which is greater than (or equal to) the value obtained in the correspond-
ing Nash equilibrium. This may be verified from the results in table 14, where
we see that total welfare is improved, when moving from Nash to Cooperative
equilibrium, by at least 5 thousand Euros (in the case of LRIC) up to 10 thou-
sands Euros (in the case of PCAP). With respect to the “second-stage only”
equilibrium, the welfare increase reaches 26 to 40 thousands Euros.
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Looking at equilibrium prices, however, we see that they are not dramatically
modified by this move to a cooperative equilibrium. The main change (with
respect to the Nash equilibrium) resides in the repartition of access charges
between customers and generators. Looking at table 15, we can see that regions
3 and 4 are not affected (or very little) by the cooperation of regulators. On the
contrary, regions 1 and 2 (the so-called smaller ones) are largely perturbed by
this cooperation: in region 1, the access charge passes from 100% on customers
to 100% on generators, and in region 2, it goes from roughly from a 70%/30%
repartition in the Nash equilibrium to a 100% on generators in the cooperative
equilibrium. The result is that generatorGen1 looses between 5 and 10 thousand
Euros (depending on the captive market rule) when switching from the Nash to
the Cooperative equilibrium, while generator in region 2 increases its profit by
roughly the same amount. Profits in regions 3 and 4 do not change significantly.
Looking at figures 5 to 7, we try to capture the sensitivity of dual values of
saturated interconnection capacities, with respect to fixed network costs. Ob-
serve how changes in the dual values are linked to access charges in surrounding
regions. The dual value on interconnection R4-R3, for instance, drops to zero
(although still saturated) at the same point where a kink appears in the dual
value on R1-R4 (at a level of 0.7 of the cost scaling factor). Looking at cus-
tomer access charges in figure 6, we may see that customers in region 4 pay no
access charge for low values of network costs, but begin to pay a positive charge
when the cost scaling factor reaches 0.7, that is, exactly at the point where dual
values on interconnections R1-R4 and R4-R3 change their behaviour. Similarly,
the dual value on interconnection R2-R3 vanishes (at scaling factor 1.2) when
customers in region 2 start to pay for access.
Important to mention is that the two interconnections R2-R3 and R3-R4 are
still used at full capacity but their dual value is zero. We conjecture this to be a
result of the multiplicity of solutions. Observe that as long as interconnections,
or at least one of them, are saturated, then at least one dual value remains
strictly non-zero. This is the case here for R4-R1, which remains positive up to a
cost scaling factor of about 2.9, from which no line is being used at full capacity
anymore. Note the apparent discontinuity of the dual value curves, together
with the evolution of access charges, around the abscises in the interval [2.7, 3.0].
This seems to indicate that at least two distinct solutions are very close to each
other in terms of welfare and that the non-linear solver “oscillates” between these
solutions. Further, when summing up all individual values of access charges
(to both customers and generators) plus the dual values on interconnection
capacities, one gets a remarkably smooth quadratic curve, as shown in figure 8.
The above discussion shows that the allocation of network costs changes
the perceived economic value of the interconnections. This phenomenon goes
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to the point where one observes cases where the access charges are increased
up to a level where the value of the interconnection becomes zero even though
they remain saturated (but not tight). This indicates that the access charge
and congestion management problems which have been considered separately
by the Florence Forum and are commonly considered as distinct issues in the
literature may be more interdependent than expected.
Finally, figure 9 illustrates the evolution of the total welfare across the dif-
ferent combinations of equilibria and regulations, setting the base case level at
zero. The total welfare is hence very sensible to the retained regulation rule on
captive markets, but its repartition among the agents (generators, captive and
eligible customers) is fairly dependent on the equilibrium model (Second-Stage
only, Nash or Cooperative).
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9 Conclusion
This paper aims at the development of a conceptual and computational frame-
work, destined to encompass the two important issues dealing with Cross-Border
Trade, addressed by the “Florence Regulatory Forum”, namely congestion of in-
terconnection capacities, and access to interconnected networks.
In short, our model manages the congestion of interconnection capacities
through a coordinated auction, where each agent pays the opportunity cost
for congested interconnection capacities. We have assumed a simplified power
distribution factors system to determine the relative usage of interconnection
by each transaction. The “auction” has been taken as the dual value of using
congested interconnection capacities.
Pricing the access to interconnected networks does not only involve the cov-
erage of local network costs in areas of injection and delivery. It also implies
the contribution to transit costs induced on other regional networks through
loop flows. ETSO has proposed several mechanisms intended to compensate
for these transit costs: these have been surveyed in section 5.4, and we have
implemented several combinations of these mechanisms in our computational
framework.
The problem is cast in the form of a game between regional regulators, and
is modelled by a two-stage equilibrium problem. In the first stage, regulators
decide on the allocation of their regional network costs between generators and
customers, taking the consequences of their decisions on the energy market into
account. These consequences are assessed by modelling the energy market as
a second-stage equilibrium, the latter being the result of imperfect competition
on deregulated market, coupled with regulated pricing on the domestic captive
markets. The “rules” that come out of the first-stage game largely influence the
final equilibrium.
We consider three versions of this game. In a first version, regulators have no
choice but to apply a priori allocation keys for their network costs; generators
and customers then respond to these allocation rules and reach an equilibrium.
This has been referred to as the Second-Stage only model. In a second alterna-
tive, regulators act separately in order to maximise their own regional welfare,
assuming that other regulators will not react to their decisions. This leads to a
Nash equilibrium. Finally, we considered the perspective of a single centralised
regulator, which maximises the overall welfare, giving raise to a Cooperative
equilibrium.
Several domestic regulations have been implemented and illustrated in this
paper (including oligopoly pricing, price caps, various forms of fully distributed
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costs and long-run incremental cost pricing). The design of the model allows for
combinations of different regulations of captive markets in different regions. The
analysis of all possible cases would in itself fill in several papers. We therefore
restrained our attention to cases where all captive customers are subject to the
same pricing rule, and assessed the impact of that regulation on the different
equilibria.
Various forms of (imperfect) competition and market power also arise on the
deregulated markets. The model copes with these different competitive assump-
tions through conjectural variation parameters. Their impact on equilibrium
has been detailed on the base case of the numerical results (i.e. second-stage
model only, subject to profit maximisation on captive markets and Cournot
competition on eligible markets).
While equilibrium prices on the deregulated markets are rather insensitive to
first-stage rules or regulation of domestic markets, they might however dramat-
ically change depending on the assumptions on competitive behaviour (tackled
through conjectural variation parameters). Prices on captive domestic mar-
kets, on the contrary, are mainly influenced by the regulatory assumption and
(in some specific cases) the number of competing generators allowed to supply
them.
Comparing the impact of the first-stage model alternatives to the domestic
market regulations, we may see that the total welfare is mainly dependent on
the regulation of the captive market, as illustrated in figure 9. However, the
repartition of the welfare between the agents (mainly through the allocation of
network costs between generators and customers) differs considerably, according
to the network cost allocation rules selected in the first stage.
The various tests conducted indicate that the model performs as expected on
those phenomena that we know well from economic theory. The assumptions
of regulation on the non-eligible market as well as those of competition on
the eligible market induce the right welfare effects. The possible distortion of
competition that results from the allocation of the fixed costs of the network
shows up as expected and welfare increases when one moves from a non co-
operative to a co-operative equilibrium. But the model also reveals questions
that may deserve more analysis in a realistic case study. It reveals that some
allocation methods foreseen by the compensation mechanism do not necessarily
perform as expected. They may reward those deemed to cause transit cost.
They may also become inapplicable in extreme conditions. This signals that they
may not work well (that is, induce undesired effects) in non-extreme conditions.
In some cases, it appears impossible to find an equilibrium when competition
increases too much.
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Even though both the compensation methods and allocations of network
costs may not influence total welfare much, they drastically influence the allo-
cation of that welfare. This is true whether across control areas or inside each
area. Last but not least, the model reveals a close interaction between the ac-
cess charge and the value of the interconnection. This indicates that these two
problems which have been considered separately by the Florence Forum and are
commonly seen as distinct issues in the literature may be more interdependent
than expected.
Further improvements on this model involve data and computational issues.
Going from the stylised model to a real world model not only involves data
collection to accurately represent a larger number of regions, it also implies the
development of a time dimension to account for the yearly procedures of the
compensation mechanism. Both these aspects will contribute to a consider-
able increase in the model size, which potentially will result in some numerical
problems.
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A Numerical Data
Customer Reference Reference Price
Segment Demand Price Elasticity
[GW] [EUR/MWh] [-]
Capt1 5.00 32.25 -0.30
Capt2 7.10 32.25 -0.30
Capt3 34.40 32.25 -0.30
Capt4 33.30 32.25 -0.30
Elig1 5.30 21.50 -0.50
Elig2 5.60 28.50 -0.50
Elig3 29.90 24.00 -0.50
Elig4 21.80 24.00 -0.50
Table 2: Customer Segment Characteristics
Generator Hourly Fixed Linear Quadratic
Name Costs coefficient vcg coefficient ωg
[EUR] [EUR/MWh] [EUR/MWh/MWh]
Gen1 150 000 15.00 0.001150
Gen2 225 000 15.00 0.000600
Gen3a 600 000 14.00 0.000375
Gen3b 300 000 14.00 0.000750
Gen4a 525 000 12.50 0.000265
Gen4b 250 000 12.50 0.000525
Table 3: Producers Characteristics
Network Hourly Fixed Linear
Operator Costs coefficient nccr,g
TSO [EUR] [EUR/MWh]
Gen1 20 000 0.30
Gen2 30 000 0.40
Gen3 120 000 0.50
Gen4 150 000 0.50
Table 4: Transmission System Characteristics
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a priori Computed Values
for Transit Cost Compensation
CF 20 000 [EUR]
x 1.0 [EUR/MWh]
XTC1 2 000 [EUR]
XTC2 3 000 [EUR]
XTC4 12 000 [EUR]
XTC4 15 000 [EUR]
Table 5: A priori values for Transit Compensation
Interconnection
Capacities
Region 1 Region 2 Region 3 Region 4
Region 1 – 1 300 – 0 500
Region 2 1 300 – 2 750 –
Region 3 – 2 750 – 2 750
Region 4 2 000 – 2 750 –
Table 6: Interconnection Capacities Characteristics
Interconnections Local Networks
Transactions
R1-R2 R2-R3 R3-R4 R4-R1 R1 R2 R3 R4
R1 −→ R1 — — — — 1.0 — — —
R1 −→ R2 1.0 — — — 1.0 1.0 — —
R1 −→ R3 0.5 0.5 -0.5 -0.5 1.0 0.5 1.0 0.5
R1 −→ R4 — — — -1.0 1.0 — — 1.0
R2 −→ R1 -1.0 — — — 1.0 1.0 — —
R2 −→ R2 — — — — — 1.0 — —
R2 −→ R3 — 1.0 — — — 1.0 1.0 —
R2 −→ R4 -0.7 0.3 0.3 -0.7 0.7 1.0 0.3 1.0
R3 −→ R1 -0.5 -0.5 0.5 0.5 1.0 0.5 1.0 0.5
R3 −→ R2 — -1.0 — — — 1.0 1.0 —
R3 −→ R3 — — — — — — 1.0 —
R3 −→ R4 — — 1.0 — — — 1.0 1.0
R4 −→ R1 — — — 1.0 1.0 — — 1.0
R4 −→ R2 0.7 -0.3 -0.3 0.7 0.7 1.0 0.3 1.0
R4 −→ R3 — — -1.0 — — — 1.0 1.0
R4 −→ R4 — — — — — — — 1.0
Table 7: Power Distribution Factors
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B Numerical Results: Tables and Figures
Region 1 Region 2 Region 3 Region 4
Network : TSO1 TSO2 TSO3 TSO4
Fixed Cost -20.00 -30.00 -120.00 -150.00
Variable Cost -4.21 -6.91 -28.26 -27.16
Access Incomes 22.10 27.78 132.62 164.07
Compensation 2.11 9.13 15.64 13.09
Net Profit 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Generators : Gen1 Gen2 Gen3a Gen4a
Fixed Cost -150.00 -225.00 -600.00 -525.00
Generation Cost -142.35 -210.42 -442.19 -404.39
Access Charge -36.51 -53.56 -64.19 -105.80
Export Tax -5.40 -8.55 -7.25 -10.20
Sales Revenues 382.53 575.41 1213.47 1244.11
Net Profit 48.26 77.87 99.85 198.72
Gen3b Gen4b
Fixed Cost — — -300.00 -250.00
Generation Cost — — -355.63 -343.32
Access Charge — — -48.97 -71.49
Export Tax — — -3.68 -4.88
Sales Revenues — — 941.60 925.33
Net Profit — — 233.32 255.65
Customers : Capt1 Capt2 Capt3 Capt4
+ Elig1 + Elig2 + Elig3 + Elig3
Power Purchase -346.78 -484.75 -2363.08 -2087.84
Utility Function 489.88 722.02 3666.17 3308.08
Consumer Surplus 143.11 237.27 1303.09 1220.24
Welfare :
Total: 3817.37 191.37 315.14 1636.25 1674.61
Table 8: Costs and Profits (in thousands EUR) at the Second-Stage equilibrium
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Volume Gen1 Gen2 Gen3a Gen3b Gen4a Gen4b
Capt1 2.63 2.63 — — — — —
Capt2 3.79 — 3.79 — — — —
Capt3 23.78 — — 12.55 11.23 — —
Capt4 23.54 — — — — 12.54 11.00
Elig1 4.12 0.53 0.57 0.91 0.40 1.16 0.55
Elig2 5.03 0.63 0.92 0.98 0.57 1.21 0.72
Elig3 22.85 2.17 3.72 5.68 3.10 5.64 2.55
Elig4 17.20 1.44 2.42 3.80 1.92 4.93 2.68
Table 9: Supplied Quantities [GW] at the Second-Stage equilibrium
Region 1 Region 2 Region 3 Region 4
Local Marginal Cost
Generator a 23.50 21.85 22.97 19.25
Generator b — — 27.11 24.20
Access Charges
for customers 3.27 3.15 0.00 4.03
for generators 0.00 0.00 3.22 0.00
λr [-] 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00
Export Tax (endog.) 1.27
Supply Price
Captive Cust. 83.26 82.38 65.43 63.75
Eligible Cust. 31.06 34.34 35.31 34.13
Table 10: Prices [EUR/MWh] at the Second-Stage equilibrium
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Lower Actual Upper Dual
Limit Flow Limit Value
[MW] [MW] [MW] [EUR/MWh]
Connection
R1 → R2 -1 300 146 1 300 —
R2 → R3 -2 750 2 750 2 750 6.21
R3 → R4 -2 750 -2 750 2 750 -5.74
R4 → R1 -500 -500 2 000 -2.15
Table 11: Interconnections: Flows, Bounds and Dual values
Reg. 1 Reg. 2 Reg. 3 Reg. 4
Programmed Exchanges
- Import [GW] 3.59 4.11 14.08 9.59
- Export [GW] 4.24 6.71 8.58 11.84
Measured Exchanges
- Import [GW] 0.00 0.15 5.50 0.50
- Export [GW] 0.65 2.75 0.00 2.75
- Local Consumption [GW] 6.75 8.82 46.63 40.74
Compensation Mechanism
Network Cost [kEUR] 24.21 36.91 148.26 177.16
Transit Cost [kEUR] 2.11 9.13 15.64 13.09
Share [-] 0.05 0.23 0.39 0.33
Export Contribution [kEUR] 5.40 8.55 10.93 15.08
Compensation Fund (endog.) 39.97
Compensation [kEUR] 2.11 9.13 15.64 13.09
Table 12: Compensation Mechanism
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Fixed Fund Fixed Tax Cost
CF x Recovery
Total Welfare [kEUR]
Fixed XTCr 3812.46 3815.25 3815.29
Alternative XTCAr (q) 3811.95 INFES 3808.14
Alternative XTCBr (q) 3812.58 3815.44 3817.37
Compensation Fund [kEUR]
Fixed XTCr 20.00 31.81 32.00
Alternative XTCAr (q) 20.00 INFES 2.51
Alternative XTCBr (q) 20.00 31.82 39.97
Export Tax [EUR/MWh]
Fixed XTCr 0.62 1.00 1.01
Alternative XTCAr (q) 0.62 INFES 0.08
Alternative XTCBr (q) 0.62 1.00 1.27
Table 13: Welfare Sensitivity to the Compensation Fund mechanism
Figure 3: Dual Value on Interconnections as a function of Network Fixed Costs,
in the Second-Stage equilibrium (using PROF regulation)
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2nd Stage Nash Cooperative
Equilibrium Equilibrium Equilibrium
Total Welfare
[million EUR]
PROF 3.817 3.852 3.858
PCAP 4.305 4.328 4.338
R-FDC 4.429 4.458 4.464
P-FDC 4.443 4.464 4.469
Q-FDC 4.452 4.475 4.481
LRIC 4.533 4.558 4.563
Capt. Mkt Price
[EUR/MWh]
PROF 63 . . . 83 64 . . . 83 64 . . . 83
PCAP 50 50 50
R-FDC 38 . . . 45 38 . . . 44 38 . . . 44
P-FDC 38 . . . 42 38 . . . 44 38 . . . 44
Q-FDC 38 . . . 42 37 . . . 42 37 . . . 42
LRIC 26 . . . 30 26 . . . 29 26 . . . 29
Elig. Mkt Price
[EUR/MWh]
PROF 31 . . . 35 32 . . . 35 31 . . . 35
PCAP 31 . . . 35 32 . . . 36 31 . . . 35
R-FDC 32 . . . 36 33 . . . 36 32 . . . 36
P-FDC 32 . . . 35 33 . . . 36 32 . . . 36
Q-FDC 32 . . . 35 33 . . . 36 32 . . . 36
LRIC 32 . . . 36 33 . . . 36 32 . . . 36
Comp. Fund
[EUR]
PROF 39 970 43 530 39 290
PCAP 35 790 33 130 36 100
R-FDC 34 480 36 410 34 580
P-FDC 34 210 36 470 34 560
Q-FDC 34 050 36 300 34 430
LRIC 32 480 34 370 32 910
Table 14: Comparison of equilibria and regulations: Welfare, Equilibrium Prices
and Compensation Fund
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2nd Stage Nash Cooperative
Equilibrium Equilibrium Equilibrium
Region 1 (G / L)
[EUR/MWh]
PROF 0.00 / 3.27 0.00 / 3.03 3.09 / 0.00
PCAP 0.00 / 2.82 0.00 / 2.71 2.65 / 0.00
R-FDC 0.00 / 2.72 0.00 / 2.61 2.57 / 0.00
P-FDC 0.00 / 2.71 0.00 / 2.60 2.56 / 0.00
Q-FDC 0.00 / 2.70 0.00 / 2.59 2.55 / 0.00
LRIC 0.00 / 2.58 0.00 / 2.49 2.44 / 0.00
Region 2 (G / L)
[EUR/MWh]
PROF 0.00 / 3.15 2.42 / 0.00 2.41 / 0.00
PCAP 0.00 / 2.76 1.53 / 0.81 2.18 / 0.00
R-FDC 0.00 / 2.65 1.49 / 0.77 2.12 / 0.00
P-FDC 0.00 / 2.65 1.60 / 0.63 2.11 / 0.00
Q-FDC 0.00 / 2.64 1.61 / 0.61 2.11 / 0.00
LRIC 0.00 / 2.53 1.56 / 0.59 2.04 / 0.00
Region 3 (G / L)
[EUR/MWh]
PROF 3.22 / 0.00 0.00 / 2.83 0.00 / 2.83
PCAP 2.96 / 0.00 0.00 / 2.69 0.00 / 2.64
R-FDC 2.89 / 0.00 0.00 / 2.58 0.00 / 2.58
P-FDC 2.83 / 0.00 0.00 / 2.57 0.00 / 2.57
Q-FDC 2.82 / 0.00 0.00 / 2.56 0.00 / 2.56
LRIC 2.70 / 0.00 0.00 / 2.44 0.00 / 2.44
Region 4 (G / L)
[EUR/MWh]
PROF 0.00 / 4.03 2.71 / 1.16 2.57 / 1.31
PCAP 0.00 / 3.71 3.64 / 0.00 2.75 / 0.83
R-FDC 0.00 / 3.50 2.50 / 0.88 2.41 / 0.97
P-FDC 0.00 / 3.51 2.45 / 0.94 2.36 / 1.04
Q-FDC 0.00 / 3.49 2.47 / 0.91 2.37 / 1.01
LRIC 0.00 / 3.30 3.16 / 0.00 3.15 / 0.00
Table 15: Comparison of equilibria and regulations: Access Charges for Gener-
ators (G) and Customers (L)
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Figure 4: Dual Value on Interconnections as a function of Network Fixed Costs,
in the 2-Stage Nash equilibrium (using PROF regulation)
Figure 5: Dual Value on Interconnections as a function of Network Fixed Costs,
in the 2-Stage Cooperative equilibrium (using PROF regulation)
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Figure 6: Access charge for Customers as a function of Network Fixed Costs,
in the 2-Stage Cooperative equilibrium (using PROF regulation)
Figure 7: Access charge for Generators as a function of Network Fixed Costs,
in the 2-Stage Cooperative equilibrium (using PROF regulation)
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Figure 8: Cumulated access charges for customers, generators, and dual values
of interconnection capacities, as a function of Network Fixed Costs (using PROF
regulation)
Figure 9: Welfare Increases with respect to the Base Case [kEUR]
